Barrett v. United States - Annotated Opinion

 When Congress passed 18 U. S. C. §924(c) in 1968, the new subsection “made it a discrete offense” to use or carry a firearm in connection with a federal crime of violence or drug trafficking crime, known as predicates. Abbott v. United States, 562 U. S. 8, 12 (2010).⁷ The original statute left open two questions relevant to today’s case. It did not specify whether a subsection (c) conviction could coexist with, or instead must displace, a conviction for the underlying predicate. And assuming two convictions could coexist, it did not specify whether the two resulting sentences should run concurrently or consecutively.

 Congress answered both questions in 1971. On the first, Congress made clear that a subsection (c) conviction must be “ ‘in addition to the punishment provided for the commission of ’ ” the predicate; that is, a violation of subsection (c) ought to result in two convictions, one for subsection (c) and one for the predicate. §13, 84 Stat. 1890. On the second, Congress mandated that the two resulting sentences run consecutively, not concurrently: “ ‘[T]he term of imprisonment imposed under this subsection [shall not] run concurrently with any term of imprisonment imposed for’ ” the predicate. Ibid.

 Congress later extended this second feature—the consecutive-sentence mandate—beyond the relationship between subsection (c)’s sentence and the predicate’s sentence, so that the consecutive-sentence mandate applies as between a subsection (c) sentence and “any other term of imprisonment.” §924(c)(1)(D)(ii); see United States v. Gonzales, 520 U. S. 1, 5 (1997). Congress did not, however, expand the double-conviction mandate. That mandate still instructs only that a subsection (c)(1) conviction shall be “in addition to the punishment provided for [the underlying] crime of violence or drug trafficking crime”—that is, the predicate. §924(c)(1)(A).

 Subsection (c) can be violated in several ways but all trigger mandatory minimum sentences. Subsection (c)(1)(A)(i) imposes a mandatory minimum sentence of five years; other provisions within subsection (c)(1) impose mandatory minimums up to life in prison, depending on the use and type of weapon and the defendant’s recidivist history. See §924(c)(1).⁸ So if the predicate offense carries a mandatory minimum sentence of its own, then a defendant will face “ ‘two consecutive mandatory minimum sentences for the single use of a single firearm.’ ” Abbott, 562 U. S., at 20.

 This case asks whether a different subsection of §924, subsection (j), piles yet another layer of punishment atop—resulting in three stacked convictions and sentences—or instead provides an alternative to subsection (c)(1)(A)(i).

 Subsection (j) arrived “decades after subsection (c).” Lora, 599 U. S., at 457. Congress added it in 1994, in a provision entitled “Death Penalty for Gun Murders During Federal Crimes of Violence and Drug Trafficking Crimes.” §60013, 108 Stat. 1973. The new subsection supplied a different penalty scheme for subsection (c) violations that cause death. Unlike subsection (c), subsection (j) did not impose mandatory minimums. Instead, it authorized significant maximum sentences—including, true to the new provision’s name, the death penalty if the underlying violation is a murder:

 “A person who, in the course of a violation of subsection (c), causes the death of a person through the use of a firearm, shall—

 “(1) if the killing is a murder (as defined in section 1111), be punished by death or by imprisonment for any term of years or for life; and

 “(2) if the killing is manslaughter (as defined in section 1112), be punished as provided in that section.” §924(j).

 The references to §1111 and §1112 relate to the pre-existing murder and manslaughter statutes, respectively. Section 1111 sets a maximum penalty of death or life imprisonment for murder. 18 U. S. C. §1111(b). And §1112 sets a maximum penalty of 15 years for voluntary manslaughter and 8 years for involuntary manslaughter. §1112(b).

 Subsection (j) gave federal prosecutors tools they lacked both in the pre-existing subsection (c) and in the pre-existing murder and manslaughter statutes. Subsection (c) does not authorize the death penalty, for example. Subsection (j) thus raised the ceiling of punishments §924 authorized, and, in doing so, offered prosecutors flexibility of another sort: time. See §3281 (“An indictment for any offense punishable by death may be found at any time without limitation”). Section 1111—the general federal murder statute—did already authorize the death penalty. But its jurisdictional reach, as well as that of the manslaughter statute (§1112), is limited to “the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States.” §§1111(b), 1112(b).⁹ The new subsection (j) had no such geographical limitation; it borrowed instead subsection (c)’s broader jurisdictional hook. So subsection (j) expanded federal jurisdiction over more killings and authorized the death penalty for those amounting to murder.

 We begin with the text. Textual clues are critical because “Congress [i]s aware of the Blockburger rule and legislate[s] with it in mind.” Albernaz v. United States, 450 U. S. 333, 342 (1981). So Congress typically includes Blockburger-surmounting language when it wishes to authorize dual convictions for the same offense. See Brief for Petitioner 28, n. 3 (listing examples).

 Failing textual support, amicus turns to the statute’s operation and structure. But this ground proves only slightly more fertile. Primarily, amicus fears that defendants convicted of and sentenced under subsection (j) will be rewarded with more lenient sentences than those convicted of the less serious subsection (c)(1) offense. He points out that subsection (c)(1) imposes mandatory minimums while subsection (j) speaks in terms of maximums. And he insists that, rather than let subsection (j) offenders out from under subsection (c)(1)’s mandatory minimums, Congress must have intended to authorize subsection (c)(1)’s mandatory minimums plus any punishment doled out under subsection (j). Cf. Abbott, 562 U. S., at 21 (rejecting construction of §924(c) under which “the worst offenders would often secure the shortest sentences”).

 Lora answers this concern without breaking a sweat. There, we explained that subsection (j)—along with several other provisions enacted simultaneously—“eschews mandatory penalties in favor of sentencing flexibility.” 599 U. S., at 462. It was not lost on us in Lora, nor is it now, that subsection (j) defines an especially serious offense. Subsection (j) simply “reflects th[at] seriousness . . . using a different approach than subsection (c)’s mandatory penalties”: by authorizing the death penalty for murder and “the same harsh punishment that the Federal Criminal Code prescribes for other manslaughters.” Id., at 463. It is for this reason, among others, that Lora—anticipating the question this case presents—explained that our conclusion in that case “aligns with” the mutually exclusive relationship between subsection (c)(1)(A)(i) and subsection (j) that we endorse today. Id., at 461.

 Just as subsection (j)’s seriousness is not lost on us, we are confident—as Congress apparently was—that it will not be lost on sentencing judges. Bound by 18 U. S. C. §3553(a) to craft a sentence that, among other considerations, reflects “the seriousness of the offense” and avoids “unwarranted sentence disparities” among similarly situated defendants, sentencing judges will doubtless recognize the relevance of a victim’s death when sentencing under subsection (j). Amicus’s worry thus strikes us as more theoretical than realistic. But if it threatens to manifest, it is not without remedy: If, in a given case, prosecutors fear that a subsection (j) sentence will dip below what subsection (c)(1)(A)(i) would otherwise guarantee, they are free to choose subsection (c)(1)(A)(i)’s low-end rigidity over subsection (j)’s high-end flexibility. See Ball, 470 U. S., at 860–861, nn. 7–8.¹⁴

 There is a textual answer to this concern, too, and here (again) §924(c)(5) plays the foil. That provision, which pertains to the use of armor-piercing ammunition, states that, “in addition to the punishment provided for” the predicate “or conviction under this section,” a defendant shall face a mandatory minimum sentence of 15 years “and,” if death results, shall be sentenced in accordance with a scheme that mirrors subsection (j)’s. (Emphasis added.) This illustrates that, when Congress wished to preserve a mandatory minimum it feared might otherwise disappear, it so specified. But subsection (j), we explained in Lora, is “cast from a different mold.” 599 U. S., at 461.

 Next, amicus highlights the physical separation in the U. S. Code between subsections (c)(1) and (j). And he underscores their independent operation, emphasizing that subsection (j)’s sentencing scheme operates without reference to subsection (c)’s.

 We have not bought such arguments before. Consider, for instance, the statutes at issue in Ball—statutes whose elements overlapped but whose sentencing schemes diverged. Those provisions, which were then located at 18 U. S. C. §§922(h) and 1202(a), prohibited certain categories of people from, respectively, receiving and possessing certain firearms. The provisions occupied parts of the Code much farther apart than the subsections of §924 at issue here. And in United States v. Batchelder, 442 U. S. 114 (1979), we explained that each statute, “in conjunction with its own sentencing provision, operate[d] independently of the other,” such that the statutes were “each fully enforceable on [their] own terms.” Id., at 118–121. We therefore concluded that the provisions did not incorporate each other’s penalties. Id., at 119. Yet, six years later (in Ball), we concluded that the two independent provisions were also mutually exclusive under Blockburger. See Ball, 470 U. S., at 861–864.

 What Batchelder is to Ball, Lora is to this case. Subsection (j) shares subsection (c)’s elements but not its sentencing scheme. See Lora, 599 U. S., at 458–459. “Instead, subsection (j) supplies its own comprehensive set of penalties that apply instead of subsection (c)’s.” Id., at 460. And as in Ball, this dynamic magnifies (rather than eliminates) the likelihood that the Blockburger presumption holds true. After all, if offenses that share elements—as they must to satisfy Blockburger—have penalties that operate on their own rather than by reference to each other, see Batchelder, 442 U. S., at 118–121; Lora, 599 U. S., at 458–459, that suggests Congress intended to place in front of prosecutors a menu, not a buffet. Accord, Jeffers v. United States, 432 U. S. 137, 156–157 (1977) (plurality opinion) (one provision’s “comprehensive penalty structure” indicated that it was not intended to supplement a lesser included provision).

 Finally, amicus analogizes this case to Garrett, in which we found Blockburger overcome even without express statutory language disclaiming the presumption. Garrett examined the relationship between the continuing criminal enterprise (CCE) statute and its constituent offenses. See 471 U. S., at 779–781.

 The distinctions from Garrett are legion, because the justifications we offered for that decision are legion. But, most straightforwardly, Garrett distinguished “the classic relation of the ‘lesser included offense’ to the greater offense,” wherein “[t]he very same conduct” violates two statutes. Id., at 787 (contrasting Brown v. Ohio, 432 U. S. 161 (1977), which involved joyriding and auto theft—both of which were violated by driving a stolen car). In Garrett, by contrast, “the continuing criminal enterprise was alleged to have spanned more than five years.” 471 U. S., at 788. The Court did not believe that Congress wished to require the Government to choose between prosecuting the defendant for early predicates and forfeiting a later CCE charge, on the one hand, and allowing him to go on breaking the law to preserve the possibility of a CCE charge, on the other. Id., at 788–790. The continuing nature of the offense played a decisive role in the case: “One who insists that the music stop and the piper be paid at a particular point,” we reasoned, “must at least have stopped dancing himself before he may seek such an accounting.” Id., at 790.¹⁵

 Today’s circumstances are markedly different. Here, we have nothing more than “the classic relation of the ‘lesser included offense’ to the greater offense.” Id., at 787.

 Amicus turns finally to legislative history. We have said that legislative history may “fortif[y]” a conclusion that Congress intends to overcome Blockburger. See Garrett, 471 U. S., at 782. But the legislative history amicus offers pertains to double convicting for subsection (c) and its predicates—a practice Congress expressly authorized in the text. See Brief for Court-Appointed Amicus Curiae 26–28. For obvious reasons, this is unhelpful data for interpreting the relationship between subsections (c) and (j). If anything, it illuminates the sort of discussion that characterizes congressional deliberation over legislation that does intend to authorize cumulative punishment—and thus highlights the notable absence of any similar deliberation over subsection (j). See Brief for National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers as Amicus Curiae 5–10.

 Rather, the only legislative history that is relevant to today’s inquiry accords with Barrett’s understanding of subsection (j). That legislative history suggests that, rather than stacking punishment or creating a brand “[n]ew . . . offens[e],” subsection (j) (at the time styled subsection (i)) “made” a “capital offens[e]” out of a “[p]re-existing crim[e]”—the one at subsection (c). Cong. Research Serv., C. Doyle, Crime Control Act of 1994: Capital Punishment Provisions Summarized, pp. 3–4 (94–721 S, 1994); see also 140 Cong. Rec. 11158 (1994) (Sen. Biden remarking that the new provision “says if you are guilty of committing a crime that results in the death of an individual through the use of a gun, you are eligible for the death penalty, assuming it is a Federal crime”).

 Like its silence in the statutory text, Congress’s debate-floor silence says a lot. The Blockburger presumption is “long-settled,” Gamble v. United States, 587 U. S. 678, 710 (2019), muscular, and fundamental to our law. We think it highly unlikely that the “ ‘lawyer’s body’ ” that is Congress, Albernaz, 450 U. S., at 341 (quoting Callanan v. United States, 364 U. S. 587, 594 (1961)), discarded Blockburger without comment here.

 Congress has not authorized convictions under both 18 U. S. C. §§924(c)(1)(A)(i) and (j) for one act that violates both provisions. The part of the judgment of the Court of Appeals that held otherwise is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.