Fcc v. At&T, Inc. - Annotated Opinion

 The Communications Act of 1934 established the Federal Communications Commission. Ch. 652, 48 Stat. 1064. The Act empowers the Commission to regulate “communication by wire and radio,” and tasks it with making effective “wire and radio communication service” available nationwide at reasonable cost. Ibid. Today, the Commission oversees electronic communications in contexts ranging from satellites to smart phones.

 As amended, the Act authorizes the Commission to seek monetary forfeitures for violations of the communications laws. An entity which the Commission “determine[s]” has “willfully or repeatedly failed to comply” with those laws or the Commission’s rules “shall be liable to the United States for a forfeiture penalty.” 47 U. S. C. §503(b). The Commission can choose between two paths to seek forfeitures.

 The first path is a formal adjudication. See §503(b)(3); 5 U. S. C. §554. An administrative law judge (or the Commission itself ) holds a hearing and may impose a penalty, with limited judicial review in the court of appeals only. 47 U. S. C. §503(b)(3)(A). In practice, the Commission does not use this process.

 The second path—the one relevant here—is a more informal proceeding. See §503(b)(4). The Commission first issues a “notice of apparent liability.” §503(b)(4)(A). The notice must specify the laws or regulations the Commission suspects the recipient to have violated, and the factual basis for those allegations. §503(b)(4). The Commission must give the recipient the chance to “show, in writing,” “why no such forfeiture penalty should be imposed.” §503(b)(4)(C). After reviewing the recipient’s response, the Commission then issues an order that “determine[s]” whether the recipient is liable and, if so, “assesse[s]” a penalty. §§503(b)(1), (b)(2)(E).

  Once the Commission issues an order, the recipient has two options. First, it may seek review in the court of appeals under the Hobbs Act. See 28 U. S. C. §2342(1). The court of appeals, sitting without a jury, then reviews the order on the administrative record under the standards set forth in the Administrative Procedure Act. 47 U. S. C. §402(a); 28 U. S. C. §2347(a); 5 U. S. C. §551 et seq., and §701 et seq.

 The recipient’s other option is to do nothing. See Action for Children’s Television v. FCC, 59 F. 3d 1249, 1261 (CADC 1995). In the event of nonpayment of a forfeiture penalty “determined under [§503(b)(4)],” the penalty “shall be recoverable . . . in a civil suit in the name of the United States.” 47 U. S. C. §504(a). The Commission thus may refer the matter to the Department of Justice, which then may—but need not—bring a civil suit within five years of the issuance of the order. See ibid.; 28 U. S. C. §2462. That suit “shall be a trial de novo.” 47 U. S. C. §504(a).

 Absent a successful enforcement suit (and resulting court order), the statute provides no other mechanism for the Commission to collect the forfeiture. The regulated party may, of course, pay the forfeiture voluntarily. But until it does, or the court in a §504 enforcement action orders payment, the Commission may not use the “notice of apparent liability . . . to the prejudice of ” the party in other Commission proceedings. §504(c).

 AT&T and Verizon (collectively, the carriers) are cellular service providers. Cellular service allows customers, using cell phones connected to the carriers’ networks, to talk, text, and exchange data with one another. To receive cellular service, the phone must periodically connect to—or “ping”—the nearest cell site in the carrier’s network. See Carpenter v. United States, 585 U. S. 296, 300–301 (2018). Every ping registers the phone’s location. See ibid. Carriers know the  locations of their cell sites, so they can be reasonably confident about the location of any given customer’s cell phone at any given time. See id., at 301. And because cell phones are generally with their owners—almost as “feature[s] of human anatomy”—the carriers in turn have a good sense of where their customers are located. Id., at 311 (quoting Riley v. California, 573 U. S. 373, 385 (2014)).

 Location data, by its nature, implicates serious privacy concerns. See Carpenter, 585 U. S., at 311, 315. But it can also provide significant benefits. For example, some companies provide location-based services. These services, like roadside assistance, require accurate location information; a tow truck is not much good if it cannot find the broken-down car. Access to location data thus enhances the quality of the providers’ service.

 Until 2019, the carriers operated location-based services programs. See 156 F. 4th 86, 92 (CA2 2025); 149 F. 4th 491, 495–496 (CA5 2025). Under those programs, the carriers sold users’ location data (through intermediaries) to service providers, who used the data to deliver location-based services. See 156 F. 4th, at 92; 149 F. 4th, at 496.

 In 2018, however, news reports revealed security breaches in the carriers’ location-based services programs. 156 F. 4th, at 93; 149 F. 4th, at 496. One high-profile incident involved a provider called Securus. Securus provided location-finding services to law enforcement officers, who in theory were required to upload legal authorization, like a warrant, to obtain location data. 156 F. 4th, at 93; 149 F. 4th, at 496. According to reports, however, a Missouri sheriff was able to access location data despite uploading “utterly irrelevant materials.” 156 F. 4th, at 93; see 149 F. 4th, at 496, n. 2.

 The Commission’s Enforcement Bureau launched an investigation into the carriers’ practices. Believing that the carriers had violated laws and regulations requiring them to take reasonable steps to keep location data confidential,  the FCC issued notices of apparent liability under §503(b)(4). See In re Verizon Communications, 35 FCC Rcd. 1698, 1712 (2020) (citing 47 U. S. C. §222; 47 CFR §64.2010(a) (2014)); In re AT&T Inc., 35 FCC Rcd. 1743, 1756 (2020) (same). After reviewing the carriers’ responses, the Commission reduced the amount of Verizon’s penalty. In re Verizon Communications, 39 FCC Rcd. 4259, 4260 (2024). But otherwise finding “no reason to cancel” the forfeitures, the Commission issued orders assessing penalties of roughly $57 million against AT&T and $47 million against Verizon. In re AT&T Inc., 39 FCC Rcd. 4216, 4216–4217 (2024); 39 FCC Rcd., at 4260.

 The carriers paid their penalties and filed petitions for review in their respective Courts of Appeals. The carriers raised multiple challenges to the Commission’s orders, including that requiring forfeiture without the opportunity for a jury trial violates the Seventh Amendment.

 The Fifth Circuit granted AT&T’s petition for review and vacated the Commission’s order. 149 F. 4th 491. The court held that the FCC’s enforcement procedures violate the Seventh Amendment because, when the Commission issues an order at the end of forfeiture proceedings, it “has already found the facts, interpreted the law, adjudged guilt, and levied punishment”—all without the involvement of a jury. Id., at 503.

 The Second Circuit denied Verizon’s petition for review. 156 F. 4th 86. Parting ways with the Fifth Circuit, the court explained that the “FCC’s forfeiture order . . . does not, by itself, compel payment.” Id., at 106. Before a carrier can be made to pay, the Department of Justice “needs to initiate a collection action” under §504. Ibid. The court thus held that the Commission does not violate the Seventh Amendment when it issues forfeiture orders without a jury. See id., at 107; see also Sprint Corp. v. FCC, 151 F. 4th 347, 359–360 (CADC 2025).

  We granted certiorari as to both decisions to resolve the conflict. 607 U. S. 1120–1121 (2026).

 The Seventh Amendment “preserve[s]” the right to trial by jury in “Suits at common law.” It applies in all proceedings, whatever their “peculiar form,” in which “legal rights” are to be “settle[d].” Parsons v. Bedford, 3 Pet. 433, 447 (1830). It does not, however, “prescribe at what stage” of a legal dispute “a trial by jury must, if demanded, be had.” Capital Traction Co. v. Hof, 174 U. S. 1, 23 (1899). The Amendment requires only that, before legal rights and obligations are conclusively “ascertained and determined,” Parsons, 3 Pet., at 447, a party has the chance to insist that a jury make the “ultimate determination of issues of fact,” Ex parte Peterson, 253 U. S. 300, 310 (1920).

 Consistent with these principles, this Court has upheld nonjury adjudications making initial findings of fact that are subject to de novo review in a subsequent jury trial.

 In Meeker v. Lehigh Valley R. Co., 236 U. S. 412 (1915), the Court considered the Hepburn Act, which authorized the Interstate Commerce Commission to prepare a report and “make an order directing” rail carriers “to pay” “damages” to customers who had been charged unreasonable rates. 34 Stat. 590. But the shipper could enforce the order only by succeeding in a subsequent jury trial where the report would serve as prima facie evidence. See ibid. The  Court rejected a Seventh Amendment challenge to this enforcement structure, which “cut[ ] off no defense,” “interpose[d] no obstacle to a full contestation of all the issues,” and took “no question of fact from” the “jury.” Meeker, 236 U. S., at 430.

 Ex parte Peterson is of a piece. 253 U. S. 300. There, the District Court (Augustus Hand, J.) appointed an “auditor” to “make and file a report” “as to the facts” concerning disputed coal deliveries, which would serve as prima facie evidence before the jury. Id., at 304. As in Meeker, we rejected a Seventh Amendment challenge to this scheme because it left for the jury the “ultimate determination of issues of fact.” 253 U. S., at 310.

 The FCC’s forfeiture proceedings fit comfortably within these precedents. The orders at issue did not settle the carriers’ legal obligations because, stated simply, they did not create an obligation to pay. And the orders did not reflect the ultimate determination of any fact because, before the carriers could have been made to pay, the Government was required to prove its case to a jury.

 First, several features of the statute demonstrate that forfeiture orders do not obligate payment. The statute nowhere gives the Commission the authority to execute on a forfeiture order; it cannot, for example, seize the carriers’ assets or obtain liens on their property. See Federal Election Comm’n v. Ted Cruz for Senate, 596 U. S. 289, 301 (2022) (agency “literally has no power to act . . . unless and until . . . authorize[d] . . . by statute” (internal quotation marks omitted)). A recipient of a forfeiture order incurs no penalties for nonpayment, and interest does not accrue on the sum. In re Amendment, 19 FCC Rcd. 6540, 6542, n. 16 (2004); FCC Directive, FCC INST 1157.5, Forfeiture Tracking, Collections and Follow-up Systems 1–3 (May 22, 2023). And under §504(c) of the Act, the Commission cannot hold “the existence of a notice of liability or an order of forfeiture” against a regulated party “unless the forfeiture has been  paid or a court” has ordered payment. Pleasant Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 564 F. 2d 496, 500 (CADC 1977); see also 15 FCC Rcd. 303, 304 (1999) (Commission will not hold “the pendency of a forfeiture action prior to final adjudication” against a regulated party); Brief for Federal Parties 40–41. The statute thus prevents the Commission from penalizing a party for failing to act in response to the mere existence of a forfeiture order, which in turn suggests that the party need not comply in the first place. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 77, 89–90.

 Second, the Commission’s factual findings have no effect in a subsequent enforcement suit. The statute provides that forfeitures under §503(b)(4) “shall be recoverable,” exclusively, in a “trial de novo.” §504(a); see also Pleasant Broadcasting, 564 F. 2d, at 500 (“Government must bring” §504 action “if it wishes to collect the fine”). And “trial de novo” means a proceeding “in which the whole case is gone into as if no trial whatever had been had” in the initial tribunal. Black’s Law Dictionary 1677 (4th ed. 1951) (emphasis added). Thus, for the purpose of a §504 trial—the only means by which the Government can collect a penalty—it is as if the Commission never found any facts at all.² Before a regulated party can be made to pay, the jury gets the last word.³

  Given these features of the Commission’s enforcement scheme, the Commission may issue forfeiture orders without the involvement of a jury. Like the ICC’s order in Meeker and the auditor’s report in Peterson, the Commission’s orders do not “settle” their recipients’ legal obligations. Parsons, 3 Pet., at 447. Nor do the Commission’s orders make any “ultimate determination[s]” of fact. Peterson, 253 U. S., at 310. The Government cannot collect before it successfully proves its case to a jury. At day’s end, a forfeiture order issued under §503(b)(4) is simply the Commission’s own determination. Its only legal effect is to enable the Department of Justice to file a suit to recover for the carriers’ suspected violations.

 Refusing to take yes for an answer, the carriers insist that they actually must pay. They point out that §503 uses words that sound in a mandatory register—the Commission “determine[s]” whether a forfeiture is appropriate, “assesse[s]” the “amount” of such a penalty, and “impose[s]” that penalty. §§503(b)(1), (b)(2)(E), (b)(4). “[A]lone and in isolation,” these words tell us little about whether a §503(b)(4) order truly settles the carriers’ rights and duties. New York v. United States, 505 U. S. 144, 169–170 (1992). The proper understanding of such statutory terms depends on “their place in the overall statutory scheme.” Turkiye Halk Bankasi A.S. v. United States, 598 U. S. 264, 275 (2023) (internal quotation marks omitted). And as explained above, the Commission is powerless to visit any  adverse consequences on a regulated party who receives a forfeiture order.⁴

 The carriers next insist that this case is SEC v. Jarkesy, 603 U. S. 109 (2024), all over again. But Jarkesy only proves our point. There, we held that the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) could not impose civil penalties using its in-house administrative process. Those penalties were immediately enforceable; the SEC could garnish the recipient’s wages or deduct a portion of the forfeiture from his tax return. See 17 CFR §§204.50, 204.52, 204.54–204.56, 204.60–204.65 (2024). And if the SEC were required to resort to judicial means of enforcement, no jury was available—at least as to the underlying legal violation. See 15 U. S. C. §78u(e); see, e.g., SEC v. Gerasimowicz, 9 F. Supp. 3d 378, 381–382 (SDNY 2014); SEC v. McCarthy, 322 F. 3d 650, 658 (CA9 2003) (“By the time a [§78u(e)] application is filed by the Commission, the time and opportunity for adjudicating the merits of the claim have been exhausted; all that is left to do is enforce the order”). That means that the ultimate determination of the facts giving rise to the obligation to pay rested not with a jury, but with the SEC alone. As we held, the Seventh Amendment forbids that result. See Jarkesy, 603 U. S., at 117, 120–121.

 No matter, the carriers say. Even if the Commission’s orders do not require payment, they contend, the Seventh Amendment nonetheless applies because forfeiture orders  have legal effect—namely, they enable the Department of Justice to initiate a §504 suit. Reply Brief 14. But the Seventh Amendment “secure[s] a right to the individual,” Parsons v. Armor, 3 Pet. 413, 425 (1830), that attaches when “legal rights” are to be “determined,” Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U. S. 575, 583 (1978). A forfeiture order under 47 U. S. C. §503(b)(4) does not determine legal rights; it is simply a “prerequisite[ ] to suit” that must be met before the Department may bring a collection action. Mach Mining, LLC v. EEOC, 575 U. S. 480, 486–487 (2015). It is thus analogous to a right-to-sue letter, see, e.g., 42 U. S. C. §2000e–5 (Equal Employment Opportunity Commission), or an exhaustion requirement, see, e.g., §1997e(a) (Prison Litigation Reform Act)—statutory conditions precedent that enable a subsequent suit, see Mach Mining, 575 U. S., at 487. The Seventh Amendment does not extend to such “preliminary” procedures. Peterson, 253 U. S., at 310.

 Finally, the carriers argue that FCC forfeiture orders cause reputational and practical harms entitling them to a jury. Brief for AT&T, Inc., et al. 35–36 (Brief for the Carriers). They contend that the Seventh Amendment applies to such harms, “even where no money is at stake.” Id., at 35. This argument is hard to square with the text of the Seventh Amendment, which applies only to suits “where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars.” See 156 F. 4th, at 106 (“we fail to see how [reputational harm] implicate[s] the Seventh Amendment, which requires a jury trial only upon an effort to collect payment of monetary damages” (citing Jarkesy, 603 U. S., at 123)).

 Textual implausibility aside, the carriers’ theory proves too much. Reputational harm may befall any party in the preliminary stage of a legal proceeding. The filing of a complaint may trigger negative press. So too may the filing of an indictment against a criminal defendant. And plaintiffs or prosecutors might dismiss the complaint or indictment before the case proceeds to a trial. See Fed. Rule Civ. Proc.  41(a)(1)(A)(i); Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 48(a). Yet this has never been thought to pose a Seventh Amendment problem.

 The judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in No. 25–406 is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. The judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in No. 25–567 is affirmed.

 When the Federal Government seeks to deprive a person of property, it must go through an Article III court. SEC v. Jarkesy, 603 U. S. 109, 151 (2024) (Gorsuch, J., concurring). “That means the regular course of trial proceedings with their usual protections, not the use of ad hoc adjudication procedures before the same agency responsible for prosecuting the law, subject only to hands-off judicial review.” Ibid. (citation omitted). Thus, as this Court held in Jarkesy and reaffirms today, agencies can collect penalties only after adjudication in court through a trial de novo. See id., at 120, 134; ante, at 10.

 The Commission determined that AT&T and Verizon violated federal law by mishandling user location data. See ante, at 4–5. The Commission sent them “Notice[s] of Apparent Liability” with its tentative conclusions. App. to Pet.  for Cert. in No. 25–406, p. 47a; App. to Pet. for Cert. in No. 25–567, p. 43a. AT&T and Verizon responded with various constitutional, statutory, and factual arguments.

 The Commission then issued “order[s]” commanding AT&T and Verizon to pay $57 million and $47 million, respectively. App. to Pet. for Cert. in No. 25–406, at 131a; App. to Pet. for Cert. in No. 25–567, at 138a–139. The orders were structured like judicial opinions. They explained what AT&T and Verizon did, what the law required, and how the law applied to the facts. The orders imposed liability for monetary penalties. In AT&T’s case, the “Ordering Clauses” said:

“IT IS ORDERED that, pursuant to section 503(b) of the Act, 47 U.S.C. § 503(b), and section 1.80 of the Commission’s rules, 47 CFR §1.80, AT&T, Inc., IS LIABLE FOR A MONETARY FORFEITURE in the amount of [$57,265,625] for willfully and repeatedly violating section 222 of the Act and section 64.2010 of the Commission’s rules.” App. to Pet. for Cert. in No. 25–406, at 131a.

 Verizon’s order contained identical language directing it to pay about $47 million. App. to Pet. for Cert. in No. 25–567, at 138a. Although the orders stated that AT&T and Verizon could receive a jury trial de novo, they also described payment of the penalty as mandatory based on the Commission’s adjudication alone: “Payment of the forfeiture shall be made in the manner provided for in section 1.80 of the Commission’s rules within thirty (30) calendar days after the release of this Forfeiture Order.” Id., at 139a; App. to Pet. for Cert. in No. 25–406, at 131a.

 In the orders, the Commission asserted that it could impose these penalties without involving an Article III court. It informed AT&T and Verizon that, contrary to what the Court holds today, agency monetary penalties such as these did not “need to be adjudicated in Article III courts with a  right to trial by jury.” App. to Pet. for Cert. in No. 25–406, at 127a. In the Commission’s view, Congress could put claims such as these “beyond the ambit of the Seventh Amendment by assigning their resolution to a forum in which jury trials are unavailable.” Id., at 127a–128a (internal quotation marks omitted); contra, ante, at 10 (majority opinion). The Commission also expressly disagreed with the Fifth Circuit’s then-recent decision in Jarkesy v. SEC, 34 F. 4th 446 (2022), which held such adjudications unconstitutional. See, e.g., App. to Pet. for Cert. in No. 25–567, at 134a. This Court would affirm the Fifth Circuit’s decision a year later. Jarkesy, 603 U. S., at 124–125, 140–141.

 Under protest, AT&T and Verizon both paid the amounts ordered, which was understood to be a precondition to their ability to file petitions for review in federal court. See Petition for Review in No. 24–60223 (CA5), ECF Doc. 1–1, p. 1, n. 1; Petition for Review in No. 24–1733 (CA2), ECF Doc. 1–1, p. 1. AT&T filed a petition for review in the Fifth Circuit, and Verizon filed one in the Second Circuit. At every stage of their cases, they preserved their position that they should have received an Article III adjudication before being forced to pay. The Fifth Circuit agreed with AT&T and set aside the Commission’s order, and the Second Circuit agreed with the Commission. We granted certiorari and consolidated the two cases. 607 U. S. 1120–1121 (2026).

 The Court accepts the Government’s newfound account that under the Act, the Commission’s self-styled “orders” were mere nonbinding notices that the regulated parties were free to ignore. See ante, at 7 (“The orders at issue . . . did not create an obligation to pay”). The Court also accepts that the orders would receive no deference in the de novo enforcement action necessary for the Commission to force payment. Ante, at 8 (“[F]or the purpose of a §504 trial—the  only means by which the Government can collect a penalty—it is as if the Commission never found any facts at all”); accord, ibid., n. 1. The Court’s decision is premised on those important limitations, which means that the Commission’s orders have no legal import except as preconditions for a future suit. See ante, at 11. I agree with the Court that this interpretation of the Act should govern future proceedings so as to bring the Commission’s enforcement practices into harmony with the Constitution.

 But as a court, we must resolve the cases before us. Regardless of what the Commission will do in the future, or what the Court believes it should have done all along, we granted certiorari in cases arising from two orders that the Commission addressed to AT&T and Verizon in 2024. At that time, neither the Commission nor the courts complied with the limits that the Court describes today.