Mullin v. Al Otro Lado - Annotated Opinion

 Two sections of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (INA or the Act), 66 Stat. 163, are central to this dispute. Congress adopted both provisions in substantially their current form in the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), 110 Stat. 3009–546. And both provisions contain the phrase “arrives in the United States.”

 The first, 8 U. S. C. §1225(a), governs the inspection of aliens who seek admission to the United States.⁴ An alien who wishes to enter the United States lawfully must first be “admitted.” As used in the INA, “admission” is a term of art that means the “lawful entry of [an] alien into the United States after inspection and authorization by an immigration officer.” §1101(a)(13)(A). So an alien cannot lawfully enter this country without first being inspected by an immigration officer, and immigration officers must inspect all aliens “who are applicants for admission or [are] otherwise seeking admission” to the United States. §1225(a)(3). An alien is deemed an “applicant for admission” if he “arrives in the United States.” §1225(a)(1). The Government correspondingly must inspect an alien who “arrives in the United States”—say, at the San Ysidro, California, port of entry through which millions of people pass every year. But an alien is not entitled to inspection until he “arrives in the United States.” The meaning of the phrase “arrives in the United States” accordingly determines whether and when the Government must inspect an alien seeking to enter the country.

  The second of the two key statutory provisions, §1158(a)(1),⁵ governs a process that may begin during inspection. During inspection, an immigration officer decides whether the alien is inadmissible under §1182, which bars entry on grounds related to, among other things, national security, foreign-policy concerns, and the alien’s health or criminal activity. If the officer concludes that the alien is inadmissible, the officer must generally “order the alien removed from the United States without further hearing or review.” §1225(b)(1)(A)(i). This procedure is known as expedited removal.

 An officer may not proceed with expedited removal, however, if the alien indicates an “intention to apply for asylum under” §1158 or voices a “fear of persecution.” §1225(b)(1)(A)(ii). In that event, the immigration officer must refer the alien to an asylum officer for what is known as a “credible fear” interview, at which the alien must establish a “significant possibility” of eligibility for asylum under §1158. Ibid.; §1225(b)(1)(B)(v). If the officer determines that the alien does not have a credible fear of persecution, the officer must “order the alien removed from the United States without further hearing or review,” although the alien may request “prompt” and limited review by an immigration judge. §§1225(b)(1)(B)(iii)(I), (III). But if the asylum officer decides that the alien does have a credible fear, the officer must detain the alien for further consideration of the alien’s application for asylum.

 Asylum is a status that entitles an alien who is a “refugee” to remain and work in the United States.  §1158(b)(1)(A). A refugee is an alien who is unable or unwilling to return to the country of his nationality “because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.” §1101(a)(42)(A). Any alien who “arrives in the United States” may apply for asylum, §1158(a)(1), and the Attorney General or the Secretary of Homeland Security may—but need not—grant such an application, §1158(b)(1)(A).

 In sum, an alien that “arrives in the United States” is entitled to inspection, is deemed an applicant for admission, and may apply for asylum. By contrast, until an alien “arrives in the United States,” he is not entitled to inspection, is not an applicant for admission, and cannot apply for asylum, except on other grounds not here at issue.

 In the spring of 2016, U. S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) began to experience a surge of aliens seeking admission at ports of entry along the U. S.-Mexico border. The number of aliens seeking to enter sometimes far exceeded the number CBP could properly process. Long delays slowed the inspection process, and, in the meantime, CBP sometimes ran short of chairs, meals, and beds. The resulting conditions were often unsafe for aliens, and they rendered border facilities unsecure.

 In November 2016, the Department of Homeland Security responded by adopting a policy of “metering” the number of arriving aliens whom CBP would inspect each day and allow to apply for asylum. To enforce the policy, officials stood on the U. S. side of the border and prevented entry into the United States by more aliens than the port could adequately process.

 The metering policy continued through the change in Presidential administrations. In April 2018, a CBP official distributed a memorandum that allowed CBP offices to  “meter the flow of travelers at the land border” when “necessary or appropriate to facilitate orderly processing” and to “maintain the security of the port and safe and sanitary conditions.” App. 122. The memorandum empowered offices to “establish and operate physical access controls at the borderline, including as close to the U.S.-Mexico border as operationally feasible.” Ibid. But officers could not “discourage” an alien “from waiting to be processed” if the alien claimed “fear of return” or sought “any other protection.” Id., at 122–123. And the memorandum stated that an alien “must be fully processed” once the alien “is in the United States.” Id., at 123. The Government reiterated the policy in a second 2018 memorandum, this one issued by the Secretary of Homeland Security. Id., at 124–129.⁶

 In 2017, asylum seekers and the immigration-advocacy organization Al Otro Lado brought a putative class action against the Government in the United States District Court for the Southern District of California. Respondents argued that CBP’s enforcement of the metering policy unlawfully withheld inspection and asylum processing from aliens who arrive at the border and seek to enter the United States. They sought class-wide declaratory and injunctive relief that would end the metering policy.

 The District Court certified a class of all noncitizens who “seek or will seek to access” the asylum process “by presenting themselves” at certain ports on the U. S.-Mexico border and “were or will be denied access” to that process by CBP officials. App. to Pet. for Cert. 300a, n. 3. The court then granted summary judgment for the class and declared that the Government’s “denial of inspection or asylum processing” to class members “who are in the process of arriving in the United States” is “unlawful regardless of the purported justification for doing so.” Id., at 253a. The administration rescinded the metering policy in November 2021, shortly after the District Court ruled the policy unlawful.

 A divided panel of the Ninth Circuit affirmed in relevant part. Al Otro Lado v. Executive Office for Immigration Review, 138 F. 4th 1102 (2025).⁷ It held that an alien “arrives in the United States”—and thus must be inspected and may apply for asylum—when the alien, while “standing on” the Mexico side of the border, encounters a United States official at the border. Id., at 1113, 1115. The majority based this conclusion on other language in the provision that allows certain aliens to apply for asylum. Such an application  may be filed by not only an alien who “arrives in the United States” but also any alien who “is physically present in the United States.” §1158(a)(1). The majority reasoned that if, as the Government maintained, an alien “arrives in the United States” only when he enters the country, the phrase “arrives in the United States” would be “completely subsumed within the phrase ‘physically present in the United States.’ ” 138 F. 4th, at 1114. The majority stated that its interpretation, by contrast, gave “every clause and word of ” §1158(a)(1) an independent meaning. Id., at 1115. And because §1225(a)(1), the provision governing inspection and admission, contains nearly identical language, the majority construed it the same way. Id., at 1118–1119. Judge Ryan Nelson dissented. He argued that an alien “arrives in the United States” only when he “crosses the border” into the United States, and he charged that the majority’s reading defied “[t]ext, history, precedent, and common sense.” Id., at 1129, 1133.

 The Ninth Circuit called for briefing on whether to rehear the case en banc, and 12 judges dissented when the court denied rehearing. Judge Bress, joined by 11 other active judges, argued that the panel’s ruling contravened the “clear statutory text” of §§1158(a)(1) and 1225(a)(1) and was “gravely wrong.” Id., at 1168, 1177. Judge Bea and two other senior judges noted their agreement with the dissents. Id., at 1177–1178 (Bea, J., respecting denial of reh’g en banc).

 We granted certiorari. Noem v. Al Otro Lado, 607 U. S. 1040 (2025).

 Even if statutory text and context were not enough to reject the Ninth Circuit’s and respondents’ interpretation of “arrives in the United States,” the presumption against extraterritoriality would tip the scale against that position. This presumption is a “ ‘longstanding principle of American law’ ” under which courts will not give a statute effect outside the territory of the United States unless Congress “ ‘clearly expresse[s]’ ” a contrary intent. Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd., 561 U. S. 247, 255 (2010); see RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Community, 579 U. S. 325, 335 (2016) (asking whether Congress “affirmatively and unmistakably instructed” that the statute have extraterritorial effect).

 We ask two questions when we analyze whether a statutory provision applies outside our borders. We first examine the text of the statute and ask whether the provision “unmistakabl[y]” applies to foreign conduct. Abitron Austria GmbH v. Hetronic Int’l, Inc., 600 U. S. 412, 417–418 (2023). If it does, the inquiry ends. If it does not, we move to the second step and ask whether the statute focuses on domestic or foreign conduct. Id., at 419.

 We have sometimes used the presumption against extraterritoriality to determine whether statutes with more-or-less settled meanings applied outside the United States. See, e.g., RJR Nabisco, 579 U. S., at 329, 338. Here, the presumption serves a somewhat different purpose: to determine whether either of two interpretations of the phrase “arrives in the United States” gives extraterritorial reach to the provisions in which that phrase appears. See Small v. United States, 544 U. S. 385, 388 (2005) (“In determining the scope of [a] statutory phrase we find help in the ‘commonsense notion that Congress generally legislates with domestic concerns in mind’ ”).

 The answer is plain. Nothing in the text of §1158(a)(1) or §§1225(a)(1) and (a)(3) manifests an unmistakable congressional intent to require that aliens be inspected and allowed to apply for asylum while they are still outside the United States. We must therefore consider the conduct relevant to the provisions’ focus. And on this score, the difference between the two interpretations favors ours. On our view, the provisions link inspection and the asylum process to what occurs on the U. S. side of the border, while the Ninth Circuit’s and respondents’ interpretation trains its sight on the other side. Because that interpretation would give the provisions extraterritorial reach, we presume that we should not read the provisions that way.

 The wisdom of the policy of metering alien arrivals at the southern border is not before us. We decide only that an alien standing in Mexico does not “arriv[e] in the United States.” The INA neither entitles such an alien to apply for asylum nor requires an immigration officer to inspect him.

 We reverse the judgment of the Ninth Circuit and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

 The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) imposes various restrictions on judicial review of immigration enforcement. As relevant here, §1252(f )(1) provides: “Regardless of the nature of the action or claim or of the identity of the party or parties bringing the action, no court (other than the Supreme Court) shall have jurisdiction or authority to enjoin or restrain the operation of ” certain parts of the INA. It contains an exception only for relief granted on an individual basis. Ibid. This provision thus “strips lower courts  of ‘jurisdiction or authority’ to ‘enjoin or restrain the operation of ’ ” these parts of the INA on a classwide basis. Garland v. Aleman Gonzalez, 596 U. S. 543, 548 (2022) (quoting §1252(f )(1)). In Aleman Gonzalez, we interpreted this jurisdictional bar to “prohibi[t] lower courts from entering injunctions that order federal officials to take or to refrain from taking actions to enforce, implement, or otherwise carry out the specified statutory provisions.” 596 U. S., at 550.

 Respondents sought relief that §1252(f )(1) prohibits. The District Court certified their proposed class of “ ‘all noncitizens who seek or will seek to access the U.S. asylum process by presenting themselves’ ” at a port of entry at the U. S.-Mexico border and who “ ‘were or will be denied access to the U.S. asylum process by or at the instruction of ’ ” border officials. Al Otro Lado v. Mayorkas, 619 F. Supp. 3d 1029, 1033, n. 2 (SD Cal. 2022). They asked the court for an injunction against the Government’s “metering” practice, which temporarily prevented class members from entering the country to be inspected under §1225. Id., at 1035–1036; see ante, at 4–5. They also asked the court to appoint a magistrate judge as a “special master . . . to monitor and oversee” the Government’s “implementation of all class-wide injunctive relief.” 619 F. Supp. 3d, at 1036.

 The District Court acknowledged that our interpretation of §1252(f )(1) in Aleman Gonzalez barred this relief. 619 F. Supp. 3d, at 1045.² It correctly concluded that Aleman Gonzalez “squarely” controls this case, such that the requested injunctive relief “must be construed as enjoining or restraining the operation of §1225 because it would have the effect of interfering with the Government’s efforts to operate §1225.” 619 F. Supp. 3d, at 1045 (internal quotation marks omitted; alterations adopted). After all, by requiring border officials to carry out §1225’s inspection and asylum-interview procedures for the class members, the requested injunction would “order federal officials to take” actions to “implement” or “carry out” a covered provision. Aleman Gonzalez, 596 U. S., at 550.

 Nonetheless, the District Court effectively gave Respondents all that they asked for in the form of nominally declaratory relief. Even after Aleman Gonzalez, the Ninth Circuit maintains that §1252(f )(1) allows “classwide declaratory relief.” Rodriguez v. Hayes, 591 F. 3d 1105, 1120 (2010); see also Al Otro Lado v. Executive Office for Immigration Review, 138 F. 4th 1102, 1123–1124 (2025) (case below). So, the District Court issued a declaration that the Government’s metering policy was unlawful. As a source of authority for this relief, it invoked §706(1) of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), which allows courts to “compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed,” 5 U. S. C. §706(1) (emphasis added). See 619 F. Supp. 3d, at 1032, 1049. Citing §706(1) and the Ninth Circuit’s precedents authorizing declaratory relief, the District Court entered a judgment “that, absent any independent, express, and lawful statutory authority, Defendants’ refusal to provide inspection or asylum processing to” aliens “who are in the process of arriving in the United States” at  ports of entry “is unlawful regardless of the purported justification for doing so.” Id., at 1049. The Ninth Circuit affirmed. 138 F. 4th, at 1123–1124, 1128.

 The United States-Mexico border is dotted with designated ports of entry. Over 20 ports of entry are designated as “Class A,” meaning they are designated to “ ‘process all aliens applying for admission into the United States.’ ” App.  193, 215. These ports abut the border and include vehicle lanes, pedestrian walkways, and an arrival hall, all staffed with Customs and Border Protection (CBP) officials. Where the Rio Grande marks the border between the two countries, arrival halls are generally at the north end of a bridge spanning the river (with the border marked by a plaque on the bridge near the river’s midpoint). At land portions of the border, the border is marked by turnstiles on the road leading to the arrival hall.

 Before 2016, pedestrians seeking asylum at a port of entry, like any other traveler seeking to enter the United States, would typically pass into U. S. territory (by bridge or through the turnstile), enter an arrival hall, and walk up to one of several desks staffed by CBP officials. A CBP officer would then review their travel documents, a process known as “inspection,” and either admit them into the United States or send them to another area for further processing. For example, a pedestrian with a valid visa might be admitted immediately, whereas a pedestrian without valid travel documents might be referred for further inspection under the expedited-removal process. See §1225(b)(1)(A)(i) (stating that the expedited-removal process applies to those who are “inadmissible under section . . . 1182(a)(7),” which renders those without valid documents inadmissible). During this process, pedestrians could also ask to fill out an asylum application and would be forwarded to an inspection area for further processing.

 In May 2016, this process began to change. Initially responding to a surge of increased migrant arrivals at a single port of entry in Southern California, CBP officials at that facility for the first time instructed arriving migrants to turn back into Mexico and return to the port at certain times for appointments. Soon, though, this “metering” system spread to other ports of entry along the southern border, with officials turning away all individuals without valid travel documents, but now without identifying any  future time for asylum proceedings. In this early period of metering, asylum seekers often stepped onto U. S. soil (sometimes reaching arrival halls and CBP desks) before being turned back to Mexico. CBP later decided, however, that because of its statutory obligations, it could not send such individuals back to Mexico without processing them for asylum. Instead, CBP began directing officials to block asylum seekers from entering the United States “at ‘the actual boundary line,’ ” which meant sending officials out of arrival halls, to bridges, and past turnstiles, where they could “sto[p] people right before they crossed the border.” Al Otro Lado v. Executive Office for Immigration Review, 138 F. 4th 1102, 1110 (CA9 2025).

 Gradually, the Government formalized this system into a “metering policy.” First, in November 2016, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) approved the practice, and CBP authorized ports of entry to “implement metering based on ‘what [worked] best operationally and whether it [was] required on any given day or [at] any specific location.’ ” Ibid. (alterations in original). Then, in formal guidance issued in 2018, CBP authorized officials across the entire southern border to “ ‘meter the flow of travelers at the land border,’ ” meaning that they could “ ‘operate physical access controls at the borderline’ ” and “ ‘may not provide tickets or appointments or otherwise schedule any person for entry.’ ” Ibid. Once a traveler was “ ‘in the United States,’ ” the guidance provided that “ ‘he or she must be fully processed.’ ” Ibid.

 The stated purpose of the Government’s metering policy, consistent with its origin, was to manage CBP “ ‘resources’ ” and respond to capacity limitations at ports of entry. Ibid. Over time, however, it became clear that the metering policy had little to do with capacity issues. According to a report by the Office of the Inspector General of DHS (OIG) issued in 2020, CBP often invoked lack of capacity as a justification for metering “regardless of the port’s actual  capacity and capability,” including while facilities sat empty. App. 397, 408; see id., at 221 (chart showing significant excess detention capacity even while metering was in effect). For some ports, detention facilities “were completely empty” 80% of the time during which they were turning away asylum seekers under the metering policy. Id., at 192. Still, as a CBP whistleblower would later testify, officers at ports on the southern border were “instructed to lie to people” by telling them “that the port was currently at capacity[,] and turning them back,” when in fact the relevant facility retained meaningful capacity to process asylum seekers. Id., at 158–159.² The OIG report also found that CBP “redirected” asylum seekers “to other port locations,” which “contravene[d] CBP’s long-standing practice to process all aliens at a ‘Class A’ port of entry.” Id., at 378. “[T]he ports to which CBP staff redirected” people “range[d] from a few miles to more than 30 miles away,” “[o]ften . . . required traversing difficult desert terrain,” and “potentially placed undocumented aliens at risk of encountering criminals who may exploit them.” Id., at 397. “Moreover, because CBP officers [did] not generally ask migrants where they [we]re from before redirecting them to another port, Mexican nationals seeking asylum” were redirected and forced to “remain in and travel through the very country in which they claim[ed] they [we]re subject to persecution.” Id., at 398–399.³

 Soon, the metering policy created dire humanitarian conditions at the border. As CBP turned back more and more asylum seekers who had traveled treacherous distances to  reach that point, makeshift camps sprung up on the Mexican side of the border, with tens of thousands of those turned away waiting days, then weeks and months, for asylum processing that often never took place. See Brief for Amnesty International USA et al. as Amici Curiae 5–6. In addition to “lack[ing] adequate food and shelter,” those turned away under the metering policy also found themselves subject to the very “persecution and crime” they were fleeing. 138 F. 4th, at 1110. One woman who had fled Honduras after receiving death threats from gang members was beaten, cut, and knocked unconscious by an unknown man after being turned back from a port of entry. Brief for Amnesty International USA et al. as Amici Curiae 11. Another asylum seeker who was turned back at a port three times was later raped in the presence of her child. Id., at 9. Those living in migrant camps were subjected to break-ins, robberies, and assaults, “ ‘fac[ing] serious harm at the hands of criminal organizations, including kidnapping, extortion, physical violence, and sexual assault.’ ” Id., at 7–8. Some were “murdered in Mexico while waiting for an opportunity to be processed by U. S. officials.” 138 F. 4th, at 1110.

 Desperate to flee these conditions and secure the opportunity to apply for asylum, “[s]ome attempted to reach U. S. soil by other means,” including by attempting to cross the border between ports of entry by trekking through deserts or swimming across the Rio Grande. Ibid. Often, these efforts had tragic ends. One couple that grew discouraged after a month of waiting in a camp near the border decided to cross the river and ask for asylum once they reached U. S. soil, but they were caught in a swift current and drowned. App. 235. Another woman also drowned, along with her 2-year-old son, after she gave up waiting in a tent camp and attempted to swim across the river. Ibid.; see 138 F. 4th, at 1110 (describing other “young children” that “tried to swim across the Rio Grande River and drowned”). Hundreds of others have met a similar fate, and many more  died crossing the desert along the southern border, all making 2020 and 2021 some of the “deadliest year[s] for migrant crossings” in various regions of the southern border.⁴

 In light of these circumstances, respondents brought this lawsuit under §706(1) of the Administrative Procedure Act, which provides that a court shall “compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed.” 5 U. S. C. §706(1). Respondents contended that CBP has a mandatory duty under 8 U. S. C. §§1225(a) and 1158(a)(1) to inspect, and to process asylum applications from, noncitizens who arrive at a port of entry and that CBP’s metering policy unlawfully withheld that mandatory duty. The Government raised two counterarguments: first, that these statutes do not impose any duty to inspect or process asylum seekers if they have not stepped foot across the border; and second, that even if this duty exists, the metering policy did not constitute “unlawful withh[olding]” of that duty.

 The Ninth Circuit agreed with respondents on both points. 138 F. 4th, at 1113. First, it held that §1225(a) requires the Government to inspect “noncitizen[s] stopped by U. S. officials at the border” and that §1158(a)(1) requires allowing such noncitizens to apply for asylum. Id., at 1118–1119. Second, it held that the metering policy constituted “withholding of agency action,” as opposed to delay of agency action, because “border officials turned away noncitizens without taking any steps to keep track of who was being turned away or otherwise allowing them to open asylum  applications.” Id., at 1122. In other words, the policy constituted a “wholesale refusal to carry out a mandatory duty,” which “le[ft] the responsibility to try again in each noncitizen’s hands.” Ibid. The panel further explained that the difference between withholding and delay of a mandatory duty “is important” because “[i]f an agency withholds a required action, it violates §706(1) regardless of its reason for doing so,” but “if an agency delays a required action, it violates §706(1) only if the delay is ‘unreasonabl[e].’ ” Id., at 1121. Thus, the panel emphasized, the Government retains “wide latitude and flexibility to carry out its duties at the border” and “[e]ven minimal steps by the Government, such as implementing and following a waitlist system or initiating the asylum process, would shift the §706(1) analysis of any challenge from the withholding category into the delay category.” Id., at 1123. Because “the Government in this case did not take any such steps,” however, the metering policy constituted unlawful withholding of a mandatory duty. Ibid.

 The implication of the Ninth Circuit’s decision, importantly, is not that the Government must instantaneously inspect and process asylum seekers at the border. All it stands for is that the Government cannot withhold that duty altogether or unreasonably delay it. All the Government was required to do under the Ninth Circuit’s decision was to process asylum seekers in a reasonable time.

 Respondents’ interpretation is further supported by the “ ‘cardinal principle of statutory construction’ that ‘a statute ought . . . to be so construed that, if it can be prevented, no clause, sentence, or word shall be superfluous, void, or insignificant.’ ” TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U. S. 19, 31 (2001).

  Here, both §§1225(a)(1) and 1158(a)(1) set out two categories of individuals: those “present in the United States” and those who “arriv[e] in the United States.” §§1158(a)(1), 1225(a)(1). When, like in §§1225(a)(1) and 1158(a)(1), two clauses are set off by a disjunctive “or,” this Court has recognized that “ ‘the words it connects are to be given separate meanings’ ” and that the latter clause should not be construed as “a mere subset of [the] first.” Loughrin v. United States, 573 U. S. 351, 357 (2014).

 Respondents’ interpretation adheres well to this basic rule. The first category (those “present”) captures those who are already inside the United States and the second (those who “arriv[e]”) captures those who are in the process of arriving into the United States. On this reading, while some individuals fit both categories, such as a person who lands at an airport and is thus both physically “present in” and “arriv[ing] in the United States,” each category also covers some individuals not included in the other.

 The majority’s interpretation, on the other hand, renders the “arrives in” category entirely superfluous. On its reading, all individuals who “arriv[e] in the United States” have stepped foot onto U. S. territory and are therefore “a mere subset,” ibid., of the category of people who are “present in the United States.” This interpretation “thus runs afoul of the ‘cardinal principle’ of interpretation that courts ‘must give effect, if possible, to every clause and word of a statute.’ ” Id., at 358.

 The majority rightly does not dispute that its interpretation renders the “arrives in” clause superfluous. Ante, at 13 (conceding that the “arrives in” clause is a “subset of those who are ‘physically present in the United States’ ”).⁷  Instead, it emphasizes that “[t]he anti-surplusage canon is not an iron rule,” and cites several instances in which this Court has declined to apply it. Ante, at 12–13. It is true that there are circumstances where the anti-surplusage canon is less salient. For example, unlike here, the canon is less helpful when no alternative interpretation avoids surplusage. See Microsoft Corp. v. i4i L. P., 564 U. S. 91, 106 (2011) (declining to apply the canon because “no interpretation” of the statute “avoids excess language”); Freeman v. Quicken Loans, Inc., 566 U. S. 624, 635 (2012) (similar). Also, unlike here, the canon may be less relevant in a statutory context, like securities law, where this Court has “long recognized considerable overlap” in statutory  provisions. Lorenzo v. SEC, 587 U. S. 71, 80 (2019) (collecting cases).

 “[T]he canon against surplusage is strongest,” however, when, like here, one “interpretation would render superfluous another part of the same statutory scheme.” Marx v. General Revenue Corp., 568 U. S. 371, 386 (2013); see United States v. Jicarilla Apache Nation, 564 U. S. 162, 185 (2011) (“ ‘As our cases have noted in the past, we are hesitant to adopt an interpretation of a congressional enactment which renders superfluous another portion of that same law’ ”); Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency & Service, Inc., 486 U. S. 825, 837, and n. 11 (1988) (collecting cases). It is particularly strange to assume Congress intended the “arrives in” clause to do no work apart from the “present in the United States” clause given that both are not only in the same law but in the very same sentence. See United States v. Taylor, 596 U. S. 845, 857 (2022) (“[W]e do not lightly assume Congress adopts two separate clauses in the same law to perform the same work”). Nor is it likely that this substantive clause “escaped Congress’s notice,” as might an “odd word or stray phrase,” Pulsifer, 601 U. S., at 143, especially given that it is replicated in both §§1225(a)(1) and 1158(a)(1).

 The majority proffers a hypothetical reason why Congress adopted the “arrives in” clause even though it is entirely superfluous. It posits that because Congress created expedited removal in IIRIRA, it likely added the “arrives in” clause in §§1225(a)(1) and 1158(a)(1) to “mak[e] it clear that arriving aliens are subject to expedited removal but that even those aliens may apply for asylum.” Ante, at 14.

 It is difficult to credit this account. Setting aside the “arrives in” clause, both §§1225(b) and 1158(a)(1) already make abundantly clear that arriving noncitizens subject to expedited removal may still apply for asylum. Section 1225(b), as the majority acknowledges, ante, at 3–4, sets out the detailed expedited-removal process, which specifies  that if a noncitizen “indicates either an intention to apply for asylum under section 1158 of this title or a fear of persecution” during “screening” for expedited removal, the officer must “refer the alien for an interview by an asylum officer.” §§1225(b)(1)(B)(i)–(ii). Section 1158(a), in turn, cross-references the expedited-removal provision, stating that any eligible noncitizen “may apply for asylum in accordance with this section or, where applicable, section 1225(b) of this title.” Even absent the “arrives in” clause, these statutes could hardly be clearer that those subject to expedited removal may still apply for asylum, thus negating the majority’s explanation for Congress’s inclusion of the “arrives in” clause.

 In the end, the majority does get one thing right: “Arriving” noncitizens do belong to a distinct legal subcategory. This subcategory is best understood to include noncitizens who walk up to ports of entry but have not yet stepped foot on U. S. territory. See supra, at 8–15. The better interpretation is thus that Congress used the term “arrives in the United States” in §§1225(a)(1) and 1158(a)(1) to capture this group of people because the “present in the United States” clause does not already capture them. Only this construction “give[s] effect . . . to every clause” of these statutes, Loughrin, 573 U. S., at 358, and keeps them both logically and historically consistent.⁸

 The complete superfluity of the majority’s construction might be understandable if there were reason to believe that doing so avoided anomalous results or otherwise conformed with the purpose of these statutes. The majority’s interpretation, however, does neither.

 Start with §1225(a). Since 1917, the inspection mandate has covered all noncitizens who are arriving at ports of the United States. Further, by amending §1225(a)(1) to apply to those who “arriv[e] in the United States,” Congress did not eliminate the inspection requirement for arriving noncitizens who have not yet stepped across the border.

 To begin, the inspection mandate has covered those who arrive at ports, regardless of where their feet are, since well before IIRIRA. Starting in 1917, the Immigration Act mandated that “[a]ll aliens arriving at ports of the United States shall be examined by at least two immigrant inspectors.” Immigration Act, §16, 39 Stat. 886; see §15, id., at 885 (“[U]pon the arrival at a port of the United States of any  vessel bringing aliens[,] it shall be the duty of the proper immigration officials to go or to send competent assistants to the vessel and there inspect all such aliens”). This iteration of the inspection mandate did not depend on whether the noncitizen had touched U. S. soil; what mattered was that they were “at” a port. This statute was later amended in 1952, through the passage of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). The INA’s inspection mandate stated that the “inspection . . . of aliens . . . seeking admission or readmission to, or the privilege of passing through the United States shall be conducted by immigration officers” and that “[a]ll aliens arriving at ports of the United States shall be examined by one or more immigration officers.” §235(a), 66 Stat. 198–199. Again, the inspection duty was triggered when noncitizens “arriv[ed] at ports,” not when they stepped foot onto U. S. territory. Ibid.

 IIRIRA amended the inspection mandate to apply to those who “arriv[e] in the United States,” 8 U. S. C. §1225(a)(1), but Congress did not eliminate the inspection requirement for arriving noncitizens who have not yet stepped across the border. IIRIRA instead enacted two different substantive changes. First, it specified in §§1225(a)(1) and (3) that any noncitizen “present in the United States” qualifies as an “applicant for admission” and that such a noncitizen must also be inspected to have lawful status. Second, it created the expedited-removal process in §1225(b) to funnel a subset of arriving noncitizens into an accelerated process.

 Before IIRIRA, the immigration system was split into “two types of proceedings in which” noncitizens could “be denied the hospitality of the United States: deportation hearings and exclusion hearings.” Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U. S. 21, 25 (1982). Noncitizens seeking to enter the United States, including those at the border who had not stepped foot onto U. S. soil, were placed into exclusion proceedings, while those “already physically in the United States” were  subject to deportation hearings. Ibid.⁹ One incongruity in that system was that deportation proceedings conferred greater procedural protections than exclusion proceedings, which benefited noncitizens who entered illegally without inspection compared to those who showed up legally at ports of entry. See id., at 25–27.

 IIRIRA addressed this issue by “abolish[ing] the distinction between exclusion and deportation procedures and creat[ing] a uniform proceeding known as ‘removal,’ ” which would apply to all noncitizens regardless of whether they were arriving or already inside the country. Vartelas v. Holder, 566 U. S. 257, 262 (2012). To facilitate this transition, “Congress made ‘admission’ the key word, and defined admission to mean ‘the lawful entry of the alien into the United States after inspection and authorization by an immigration officer.’ ” Ibid. It correspondingly modified §1225(a) by defining an “applicant for admission” as any noncitizen who was either “present in the United States who has not been admitted or who arrives in the United States,” §1225(a)(1), and then adding that inspection is required of all noncitizens “who are applicants for admission or otherwise seeking admission,” §1225(a)(3).

 This change, properly contextualized, did not exclude those at the border from being “applicants for admission,” but rather “redefine[d] applicants for admission to include  aliens who entered the United States without inspection.” 62 Fed. Reg. 10312 (describing IIRIRA’s changes). As the Committee Report explained, IIRIRA was designed to ensure that noncitizens “who have entered the United States without inspection” do not “gain equities and privileges in immigration proceedings that are not available to aliens who present themselves for inspection at a port of entry.” H. R. Rep. No. 104–469, p. 225 (1996); see id., at 157 (explaining that IIRIRA subjected noncitizens who entered unlawfully to “the same burden” as someone “seeking to be admitted at a port of entry”); id., at 228 (similar).¹⁰

 In tandem with abolishing the distinction between exclusion and deportation proceedings, IIRIRA enacted a second substantive change to §1225: the creation of expedited removal in §1225(b). Section 1225(b) requires that certain arriving noncitizens (such as those without valid travel documents) be inspected and removed through the expedited-removal process. §1225(b)(1)(A)(i). By enacting §1225(b), Congress evinced no intent to allow immigration officers to turn away arriving noncitizens who have not stepped onto U. S. soil, i.e., those who would have been subject to exclusion proceedings in the pre-IIRIRA system. Instead, as the Conference Report on IIRIRA explained, Congress funneled a subset of those arriving noncitizens through expedited removal in order to promote faster inspection and removal “while [still] providing an opportunity for such an alien who claims asylum to have the merits of his or her claim promptly assessed.” H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 104–828, p. 209 (1996).

 Finally, there is no other evidence that Congress amended §1225(a) to create the “one foot across the border” rule that the majority today imposes. Indeed, the  Committee Report described IIRIRA’s amended §1225(a) as applying to any noncitizen who “arrives at the United States, whether or not at a designated port of arrival,” H. R. Rep. No. 104–469, at 228, reinforcing again that the majority’s fixation on the preposition “in” is misplaced.¹¹ The federal regulations implementing IIRIRA understood §1225 the same way as soon as IIRIRA was passed. See supra, at 12. The history of §1225(a) thus reinforces that it applies to all who are arriving, including those who have not yet crossed the border.

 The history of the asylum statute, §1158(a)(1), similarly shows that IIRIRA did not narrow its scope.

 Section 1158(a) and the rest of the current asylum system developed in response to the international moral reckoning that followed the Holocaust and World War II. One infamous incident, the voyage of the M. S. St. Louis, is emblematic. In 1939, over 900 Jewish refugees attempted to flee persecution in Nazi Germany by setting sail aboard the M. S. St. Louis, which was headed to Cuba and the United  States.¹² The ship docked in the Havana harbor for days, but the Cuban Government refused to allow the fleeing passengers offboard. The ship then sailed near the Miami coastline, but the U. S. Government also turned them away in part because the immigration laws at the time had strict country quotas and the relevant quota was already filled for that year. The ship sailed to Canada and was again turned away. It eventually returned to Europe. Tragically, over 500 of the refugees that had attempted to flee were trapped in Western Europe under German control, and over 250 of them died during the Holocaust. Most of them were “murdered in the killing centers of Auschwitz and Sobibór” and “the rest died in internment camps, in hiding, or attempting to evade the Nazis.” S. Ogilvie & S. Miller, Refuge Denied: The St. Louis Passengers and the Holocaust 174–175 (2006).

 In the wake of World War II, the United States negotiated international treaties with other nations to prevent future incidents like the voyage of the M. S. St. Louis. This culminated in the Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U. S. T. 6223, T. I. A. S. No. 6577 (1967 Protocol), to which the United States acceded in 1968.¹³ The 1967 Protocol, among other things, prohibits “refoulement,” meaning that contracting states may not “expel or return (‘refouler’) a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where” she would face persecution based on her protected characteristics. Id., at 6276; see Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc., 509 U. S. 155, 181–182 (1993) (explaining that the terms of this  nonrefoulement obligation “imply that ‘return’ means a defensive act of resistance or exclusion at a border”).

 “[T]o bring United States refugee law into conformance with” the 1967 Protocol, Congress passed the Refugee Act of 1980. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U. S. 421, 436 (1987). To comply with the nonrefoulement obligation, the Act prohibited the “deport[ation] or return [of] any alien . . . to a country” if that person would be persecuted on account of protected characteristics, a mandatory form of relief called withholding of removal. Id., at 429–430, n. 9 (citing 8 U. S. C. §1253(h)(1)). It also standardized the asylum-eligibility criteria by enacting §1158(a)(1), which at the time permitted noncitizens to apply for asylum if they were “physically present in the United States or at a land border or port of entry, irrespective of [their] status.” Refugee Act of 1980, §201(b), 94 Stat. 105. Although these two forms of relief are distinct, they were (and still are) accessible through the same form. See Brief for Petitioners 32; 8 CFR 208.3(b). Thus, as the plain text stated, the Refugee Act permitted anyone who was “at a land border or port of entry,” even if they had not stepped foot onto U. S. soil, to apply for asylum and withholding of removal. See ante, at 10 (agreeing on the Refugee Act’s reach); see also INS v. Stevic, 467 U. S. 407, 423, n. 18 (1984) (explaining that §208 of the Refugee Act applied to noncitizens “either in the United States or at our borders”); Sale, 509 U. S., at 177 (agreeing that the Refugee Act “authorize[d] relief for [noncitizens] at the border seeking protection as refugees”).¹⁴

  The central question, then, is whether Congress intended to narrow the scope of §1158(a)(1) to only noncitizens who stepped foot across the border when, in enacting IIRIRA, it amended the Refugee Act’s language to the current “arrives in the United States (whether or not at a designated port of arrival . . . )” language. Given that §1158(a)(1) was originally enacted to comply with the United States’ treaty obligations under the 1967 Protocol, it would be strange to construe Congress as abdicating those obligations with this amendment without any affirmative indication that it sought to do so. Congress, after all, “ ‘does not alter the fundamental details’ of an existing scheme with ‘vague terms’ and ‘subtle device[s].’ ” Hall v. Hall, 584 U. S. 59, 74 (2018). Nor does this Court normally presume that Congress intends to depart from its international obligations. Cf. Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 2 Cranch 64, 118 (1804) (“[A]n act of Congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible construction remains”).

 Instead, the most plausible explanation for this change is that Congress adopted the “arrives in” language in §1158(a)(1) to conform it to the newly reworked inspection mandate and expedited-removal procedures, both of which now refer to “arriving” noncitizens. See supra, at 27–29. The legislative history confirms this understanding. The Committee Report on IIRIRA stated that §1158(a)(1) continues to allow “any alien who is physically present in the United States or at the border of the United States, regardless of status, . . . to apply for asylum.” H. R. Rep. No. 104–469, at 259. The Report evinced no intent by Congress to narrow the scope of §1158(a)(1) solely to those who cross the border, nor has any party pointed to any other evidence of such an intent. See id., at 173–176 (describing other changes to the asylum system with no mention of narrowing scope of §1158(a)(1)); id., at 175 (describing intention to  “streamlin[e] the asylum process, while ensuring that no alien will be returned to persecution”).

 In the end, the histories of §§1225(a) and 1158(a)(1) reinforce rather than undermine the understanding that these statutes permit noncitizens in the process of arriving, regardless of where their feet are, to apply for asylum.

 Congress passed the Refugee Act in 1980 because it did not want this country to repeat the mistakes of its past. Yet if the refugees on the M. S. St. Louis were to walk up to a port of entry on our southern border today, the majority’s interpretation would allow immigration officers to refuse even to consider their asylum applications by physically blocking them from stepping foot onto U. S. soil. The majority’s interpretation permits the Government to do that even if the refugees complied with all applicable laws and regulations, even if the port had ample capacity to inspect them, and even if turning them back would result in the very persecution from which they narrowly escaped. The consequences of today’s decision are predictable. More people will die. More people will attempt to cross the border illegally, and some will make it while others will not. More  people will be forced to walk along the U. S.-Mexico border in dangerous conditions, trying to find a port that will inspect them. More people will turn back and be subjected to violence because of something they cannot or should not have to change about themselves, such as their race, religion, nationality, or political opinion. Because this is neither what Congress said nor what its words permit, I respectfully dissent.